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Abstract 
This paper shows how the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
(MIP) could be streamlined and its underlying conceptual 
framework clarified. Implementation of the country-specific 
recommendations is low; their internal consistency is sometimes 
missing; despite past reforms, the MIP remains largely a country-
by-country approach running the risk of aggravating the 
deflationary bias in the euro area. 
We recommend to streamline the scoreboard around a few 
meaningful indicators, involve national macro-prudential and 
productivity councils, better connect the various 
recommendations, simplify the language and further involve the 
Commission into national policy discussions. 
This document was prepared for the Economic Governance 
Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) was introduced in 2011 as part of the 'six-pack' reform 
of economic governance. It aims to identify, prevent and address macroeconomic imbalances that 
could adversely affect economic stability in a particular EU country, the euro area, or the EU as a whole. 
The empirical analysis provided in this paper, however, shows that: 
• Implementation rate of the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) has been declining over 
time; although imbalances have clearly receded in the euro area and in the EU over 2013-2018, 
there is no apparent link with the implementation of the CSRs; 
• Despite past reforms, the MIP keeps still largely a country-by-country approach, running the 
risk of contributing to a deflationary bias in the euro area; 
• The MIP scoreboard could be simplified with little loss in terms of early-warning performance; 
some indicators need to be re-defined consistently with the objective of convergence within 
the euro area; 
• The consistency among the CSRs and the recommendations made by the IMF and the OECD 
varies greatly across countries; the CSRs are less clear on the financial sector than the IMF is, 
and they are not always connected to the recommendations made by the ESRB; 
• The CSRs sometimes lack internal consistency, especially for countries with high current 
accounts surplus and with respect to the connection with the recommendations to the euro 
area. 
• National policy-makers and experts are often totally unaware of the entire European Semester 
process. Communication is often done in technical and administrative form – failing to trigger 
interest in national debates. 
Recommendations 
1. Streamline the scoreboard around a few meaningful indicators; check that they are geared towards 
intra-euro area imbalances rather than performance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
2. In the recommendation to the euro area, include a section explaining the strategy to reduce 
imbalances, the contribution of each Member State being specified. 
3. Focus MIP-CSRs on policy actions that can have direct impact on imbalances. Involve national macro-
prudential authorities and national productivity councils; coordinate the timetable of the European 
semester with that of ESRB’s recommendations; 
4. Simplify the language and further involve the Commission into national policy discussions. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The Macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP) was introduced in 2011 as part of the 'six-pack' reform 
of economic governance. It aims to identify, prevent and address macroeconomic imbalances that 
could adversely affect economic stability in a particular EU country, the euro area, or the EU as a whole.1 
The MIP was introduced at the height of the crisis, at a moment when the political system had a clear 
understanding that the euro area had built up significant imbalances in the run-up to the crisis. These 
imbalances were visible in high current account deficits, high external indebtedness, loss of price and 
cost competitiveness and significant housing bubbles. Several countries with such problems were at 
risk of losing market access or had already lost such access.  
At the time, a number of analytical papers demonstrated that these divergences were not primarily 
driven by the fiscal policies of the respective Member States, but rather had their root causes in financial 
developments, especially private credit growth (Ruscher et al 2010a,b; Balta et al 2009). The boost in 
domestic demand led to current account deficits and an appreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate, due to the change in the prices and wages of the non-tradable and tradable sector (Ruscher and 
Wolff 2009). As productive capacities were reallocated from the tradable sector towards construction 
and other domestic sectors, trade deficits surged. Except for Greece, these developments were not 
driven by public deficits, but rather by private sector borrowing. 
The crises that resulted in countries with high current account deficit were due to sudden stops of 
private capital inflows, i.e. they were very similar to balance of payment crises, which economists had 
thought of as unthinkable for the euro area. Influential economists even claimed that the current 
account deficits preceding the crisis were no reason whatsoever to worry, as they just reflected the 
natural “downhill flow” of capital to countries with lower income (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). IMF 
surveillance of euro area countries up to at least 2005-06 also failed to recognize the magnitude of the 
problem that was building up, and considered that current account deficits were a benign 
phenomenon in the euro area, as balance of payment crises were supposedly impossible in a single 
currency area (see e.g. Pisani-Ferry et al 2011). This view was clearly reversed after the crisis. For 
instance, Giavazzi and Spaventa (2011) argued that capital inflows to peripheral European countries 
were misallocated to construction and other non-tradable sectors: their current account deficits were 
unsustainable because the sectors receiving foreign investments were unable to raise their 
productivity. 
By 2010, it was clear that the euro area urgently needed a mechanism to deal with and prevent 
macroeconomic imbalances that were not driven by fiscal policies, for which the euro area had the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), but by private sector’s decisions. The MIP was therefore established, 
with the legal basis of Articles 121 and 136 of the TFEU, and was enshrined in two regulations. 
Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances sets out 
the MIP procedure and applies to all EU countries. Regulation (EU) 1174/2011 on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances specifies the Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure (EIP) that includes a sanction mechanism for euro area countries. 
The basic idea of the two regulations was that an “Alert mechanism”, based on the so-called “MIP 
scoreboard”, would trigger an in-depth investigation by the Commission into whether a country suffers 
of an economic imbalance (see the description of the MIP scoreboard and classification in Annex A). If 
                                                             
1 “Surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to include 
a more detailed and formal framework to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and to help the Member States 
affected to establish corrective plans before divergences become entrenched.” (Paragraph 7 of Regulation No 1176/2011). 
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the in-depth investigation concludes that it does, policy recommendations would be given to the 
country by the Council, based on a proposal by the Commission. These recommendations are legally 
binding in EU law, just as the fiscal recommendations from the SGP are. Non-compliance in the case of 
excessive imbalances, especially in the case of large external imbalances,2 could lead to sanctions for 
euro area countries.  
The scoreboard, which includes 14 “main indicators” and 28 “auxiliary indicators”3, has been subject to 
much debate (see i.e. Bénassy-Quéré, 2015). An important aspect concerns the way current-account 
surpluses should be considered in a monetary union. On the one hand, the risk of a financial crisis is 
clearly higher in current account deficit than in surplus countries; on the other hand, the increase in 
current account deficits in the pre-crisis years was mirrored by a simultaneous increase in current 
account surpluses (keeping the euro area current account roughly balanced). More recently, the 
reduction in deficits has not been mirrored by reduced surpluses, hence the aggregate external 
balance of the euro area moved from balance in 2007 to a surplus of over 3% in 2018. Such aggregate 
surplus reflects excess savings over investment at the aggregate level and has gone hand in hand with 
low inflation. In turn, low inflation on average has made it more difficult to carry out relative price 
adjustments without highly indebted countries incurring the risk of falling into debt-deflation. 
Furthermore, since the euro is a floating currency, a current-account surplus at aggregate level will 
likely trigger an exchange-rate appreciation, other things being equal, which dampens aggregate 
demand, as exports become more expensive, and does not produce any gain in terms of 
competitiveness. 
The MIP regulation is somewhat contradictory on how to deal with current account imbalances. Article 
4.4 states that “The choice of [scoreboard] indicators and thresholds shall be conducive towards 
promoting competitiveness in the Union”, which suggests that an aggregate current-account surplus 
is considered to be a good thing. However the preamble (paragraph 17) states that “in Member States 
that accumulate large current account surpluses, policies should aim to identify and implement 
measures that help strengthen their domestic demand and growth potential”.  
While the Commission had originally proposed to translate the regulation into a symmetric threshold 
of +4 and -4% for the current account, the final scoreboard refers to +6 and -4 %. Furthermore, various 
indicators are defined in a way that is as ambivalent, as the MIP regulation itself. For instance, the 
evolution of the real effective exchange rate is calculated against 41 industrial countries, hence it is 
sensitive to the exchange rate of the euro against non-EU currencies. More worrisome, the evolution 
of unit labour costs (ULCs) is calculated in nominal terms. This feature could lead to a “race-to-the-
bottom” in the euro area, each country trying to reduce its ULCs (or limit their increase), which would 
keep inflation at a low level without any gain in terms of price competitiveness. More generally, the 
scoreboard adopts a country-by-country approach, instead of trying to quantify intra-EU imbalances. 
This is especially problematic for euro area countries. It could be argued that this approach is benign, 
since the scoreboard is never directly used in the classification of countries. After all, the scoreboard is 
only the trigger for an in-depth investigation that relies on judgement when classifying countries and 
giving them recommendations. However, misleading indicators such as nominal unit labour costs or 
                                                             
2 “The need for policy action is particularly pressing in Member States showing persistently large current-account deficits and 
competitiveness losses.” (Regulation No 1176/2011, Paragraph 17). 
3 The indicators may vary over time. As recalled by European Commission (2016), the first scoreboard included 10 headline 
indicators and 19 auxiliary indicators. Financial sector variables and especially employment indicators were later added to the 
scoreboard. 
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real effective exchange rates against 41 other countries are not a good starting point to exert 
judgement.4  
Since 2013, some efforts have been made to better frame the Country-Specific Recommendations 
(CSRs) to euro area Member States into a euro-wide strategy. The CSRs now specify how they contribute 
to the rebalancing of the euro area consistently with the recommendations to the euro area. However, 
the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), which kicks-starts the European semester, studies the euro area as a 
whole without mentioning specific imbalances within the euro area. The euro area recommendations 
also avoid mentioning any specific member state. Since December 2019 (hence for the 2020 semester), 
the AGS has been replaced by the Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy. In the document published in 
December 2019, the expression “macroeconomic imbalance” has disappeared (whereas there were 
three occurrences in the AGS of the 2019 semester). In fact, it is only in the accompanying document 
of the euro area recommendation (“Analysis of the Euro Area economy”) that euro area Member States 
are compared and the convergence analysis is made to a certain extent. 
Aside from the European Commission itself, relatively few studies have systematically analysed 
whether the MIP has been an effective mechanism in preventing and addressing macroeconomic 
imbalances. The European Court of Auditors found that although the MIP is generally well designed, 
the Commission is not implementing it in a way that would ensure effective prevention and correction 
of imbalances. It also argues that the “classification of Member States with imbalances lacks transparency, 
the Commission’s in-depth analysis despite being of a good standard has become less visible and there is 
lack of public awareness of the procedure and its implications.” (ECA 2018, p. 85). The Court recommends 
to improve certain aspects of its management and to give greater prominence to the MIP. 
In this paper, we argue that the MIP could be improved, based on existing instruments, by acting 
simultaneously at three levels: (i) the scoreboard, (ii) the recommendations, and (iii) national 
ownership. In Section 2, we discuss the implementation record of countries with respect to the annual 
CSRs and the evolution of imbalances according to the scoreboard. Section 3 turns to the scoreboard 
itself, which we analyse over a longer period. In Section 4, we look more closely at the country 
classification of the MIP and, more specifically, at the 2019 vintage. We study its consistency both 
internally (across Member States and with the recommendations to the euro area) and externally 
(compared with IMF and OECD recommendations). In Section 5, we provide recommendations on how 
to improve the MIP and increase its usefulness for the macroeconomic management of the euro area. 
One of our recommendations also refers to how to increase the ownership at the national level, which 
we consider of central importance for the success of the MIP. 
  
                                                             
4 Additionally, as noted by the ECOFIN Council,in 2016, the indicators may not always be geared towards macroeconomic 
imbalances: “[The Council] underlines that social and labour market indicators are not relevant for identifying macro-financial 
risks and developments in these indicators cannot trigger steps in the MIP process” (Council Conclusions on Alert Mechanism 
Report 2016). 
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 EFECTIVENESS OF THE MIP 
As part of the European semester, EU Member States receive policy recommendations under three 
different headings: SGP, MIP and “integrated guidelines” (IGs) related to the Europe 2020 growth and 
employment strategies. As evidenced by Hagelstam et al. (2019), recommendations related to IGs and 
to the MIP are often bundled together. Bénassy-Quéré (2017) further notes that the same 
recommendations can appear under the MIP or under IGs depending on whether a country is classified 
with no imbalances or with imbalances.  
Here we rely on the implementation of the CSRs assessed by the European Commission in the country 
reports, with specific focus on MIP-CSRs. Previous research has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the 
MIP. Efstathiou and Wolff (2019) cannot find a statistically significant effect from the recommendations. 
Bricongne, Mata Garcia and Turrini (2019) find a statistically significant effect. However, they include a 
dummy for “hard-to-comply-with recommendations”, which captures recommendations that would 
have high political costs. As it would be expected, the implementation with the other 
recommendations that carry little political costs is higher – but likely also the effectiveness will then be 
lower, as the impact of easy reforms is small (this is why they are easy).  
The empirical results on the relatively low effectiveness of macroeconomic and structural policy 
recommendations given to countries rhyme with an established literature on the euro area governance 
framework predating the MIP. Ioannu and Stracca (2014) find strong and robust evidence that neither 
the SGP nor the Lisbon strategy had a significant and beneficial impact on economic and fiscal 
performance outcomes. However, the evidence on the impact of fiscal rules is more nuanced than that. 
The literature finds some evidence that rules constrain fiscal outcomes (Heinemann et al 2018) and 
there is evidence that the more legally strong and binding fiscal rules are, the more effective they are 
(Iara and Wolff 2014). However, fiscal performance is only one aspect of MIP assessment. 
Assessing the effectiveness can be done through two complementary approaches. The first one relies 
on whether countries did implement the relevant country-specific recommendations. The second 
approach is to look at whether the scoreboard indicators improved, following the implementation of 
country-specific recommendations. 
2.1. Implementation rates 
If judged on the basis of the implementation rate of CSRs, simple descriptive charts cast serious doubts 
on the overall effectiveness of the MIP framework. In Figure 1, we show the average implementation 
rate across all recommendations and all Member States for each year from 2013 to 2018. The 
implementation rates are calculated based on CSRs subparts, following the decomposition proposed 
by the Commission in its country reports.5 We also show the average implementation rates for MIP-
CSRs and finally average implementation rates for countries with excessive imbalances (in the latter 
case, all recommendations are accounted for, but most of them fall into the MIP category). 
The chart makes for a grim reading. Average implementation rates are less than 50%, i.e. on average 
implementation is only partial. Detailed implementation rates are telling even more: over the whole 
period and for all countries together, CSRs that are “fully addressed” represent only 2%, and those that 
show “substantial progress” represent 8%. In fact, the most frequent assessments are “limited progress 
(39%) and “some progress” (38%), the remaining 13% being “no progress”. Moreover, implementation 
                                                             
5 The division into subparts results from the complexity of the recommendations and it allows for a more specific analysis of 
their scope. 
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rates have been falling substantially in the last 5 years. The chart also shows that implementation rates 
are higher when it comes to MIP-CSRs. However, this better picture only occurred during 2013-15 and 
since then there does not seem to be a systematic difference. Finally, the picture reveals that for 
countries in excessive imbalance, implementation rates were initially higher but for these countries, 
despite the fact that the legal framework is stricter and the reform needs are more pressing, the decline 
in implementation rates has been more significant. After 2015, it is difficult to identify any difference in 
implementation rates between MIP and non-MIP CSRs. Overall, this chart puts doubt on the 
effectiveness of recommendations. Instead, it suggests that reforms were only implemented when the 
financial pressure was big and fundamentals were looking weak.6 
 
Figure 1: Average implementation rates per year, in percent of sub-CSRs 
2013-18 
 
Source: Esthathiou and Wolff (2019). Years refer to the CSRs. Recommendations of year t are assessed in year t+1. 
 
 
In Figure 2, we compare implementation rates across countries. Among countries that have received 
at least ten sub-CSRs in the entire period, implementation rates of MIP-CSRs and non-MIP ones do not 
differ systematically. 
  
                                                             
6 This evidence is consistent with Darvas and Leandro (2015) who find no major difference in the implementation rates for 
CSRs and for OECD recommendations except for countries that are under a financial assistance programme. 
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Figure 2: Average implementation rates per country, in percent of sub-CSRs* 
2013-18 
  
* The countries shown have at least 10 sub-CSRs under each legal basis over the entire period. Scores: no progress=0, limited 
progress=25, some progress=50, substantial progress=75, fully implemented=100).  
Source: Esthathiou and Wolff (2019).  
 
A counter-argument often made in response to these numbers is that countries tend to implement 
recommendations with some delay, for example after two or three years, especially since many reforms 
require several years to be legislated and implemented. We explored this argument for two countries, 
Germany and the Netherlands. Germany had an implementation rate below 25% in 2015 and 2017 and 
never an implementation rate above 40%. The Netherlands seems doing on average slightly better. But 
are the recommendations perhaps implemented after a few years? We note that the recommendation 
to Germany to increase public investment was given every year from 2014 to 2019. While the precise 
formulation varied, “limited progress” alternated with “some progress”. Also, the recommendation to 
Germany on the efficiency of the tax system was repeated several times. In the Netherlands, one key 
issue concerns the housing market and also there we see that recommendations are repeated year 
after year, even though with different formulations. The fact that recommendations are repeated year 
after year, even if with slight changes of the formulation, suggests that at least in some countries 
implementation rates remain weak even a few years after the recommendation is first received.  
 
2.2. Evolution of scoreboard performance 
This section explores whether higher implementation rates actually correspond to bigger reductions 
in imbalances, measured by a reduced proportion of flashing indicators in the scoreboard.7 In principle, 
one should expect that a better implementation of reforms should be associated with a faster and 
                                                             
7 Here we follow the logic of the scoreboard that defines a range of adequate values for each indicator, the values out of the 
range triggering a “flash” whatever their distance to the threshold. 
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better reduction in imbalances. Figure 3 reveals two main messages. First, in all countries - but the UK 
- the imbalances as measured in the scoreboard receded or stayed stable between 2013 and 2018. 
Second, there is no correlation between implementation rates of recommendations and imbalances.8  
 
Figure 3: CSR implementation and scoreboard outcome, 2013-18* 
 
* In orange: countries that were under financial assistance programs during part of the period (assessment rates are then 
calculated over the remaining years).  
Reading: on average over 2013-18, Italy’s implementation rate was 37%; between 2013 and 2018, the percentage of 
scoreboard main indicators flashing in Italy fell from 43% to 14%, i.e. by almost 30 percentage points. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on scoreboard and Esthathiou and Wolff (2019) database. 
 
Pierluigi and Sondermann (2018) argue that the improvement in the scoreboard during this period is 
mainly due to “flow” indicators, whereas “stock” indicators did not improve.9 Our calculations rather 
highlight an improvement in labour markets over 2013-18 (Figure 4). Among the 14 main scoreboard 
indicators, 4 concern the labour market: change in activity rate, moving average of unemployment rate, 
change in long-term unemployment rate, and change in youth unemployment rate (see Annex A). It 
could be that the improvement in the scoreboard over 2013-18 was partly driven by labour market 
reforms. However, the implementation rates are not found systematically higher for labour market 
reforms than for the other parts of the country-specific recommendations (see Annex B). More 
                                                             
8 Dividing the period into two sub-periods (2013-15 and 2015-18) does not change the overall picture, except for the fact that 
the scoreboard improvement has not been linear in most countries. 
9 The distinction comes from European Commission (2016). The Commission defines unit labour cost growth, the 
unemployment rate, the current account balance, house price increase and credit growth as flow variables, while the 
stock of public and private sector debt, as well as the net international investment positions, are stock variables. 
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realistically, the situation in the labour market improved or at least stabilized since 2013 as the 
economy was recovering. Among the four labour market indicators, three are changes in 
unemployment or activity rates, which means that just stabilizing unemployment reduces the number 
of flashes in the scoreboard.10 
 
Figure 4: number of countries with flashing indicators across Member States, 2013-18 
(all EU countries) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MIP scoreboard. 
 
 COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS: 1999-2018 
 
It is obviously difficult to guess whether the MIP would have made a difference had it been in place 
already in 1999. What we can do though is to calculate the scoreboard from 1999 to 2018 and study 
whether it would have helped identifying excessive macroeconomic imbalances and related risks for 
financial stability in the euro area. 
 
As already mentioned, the MIP relies on a scoreboard with 14 main indicators and 28 auxiliary 
indicators. Here we focus on the 14 main indicators, since thresholds are set for them only. We calculate 
them since 1999. In Section 3.1, we analyse the connections between the scoreboard indicators and 
standard theoretical macroeconomic analysis of imbalances. In Section 3.2, we discuss the performance 
of the scoreboard as an early-warning system and explore ways to improve this performance. 
 
3.1. The logic of the scoreboard  
 
The indicators that are included in the scoreboard, and their respective thresholds, have been selected 
so as to cover the main sources of macroeconomic imbalances along two complementary dimensions 
(c.f. Regulation No 1176/2011, Art. 4.3): internal imbalances (“public and private indebtedness; financial 
and asset market developments, including housing; the evolution of private sector credit flow; and the 
                                                             
10 A similar argument can be made with external deficits, which have been reduced mainly due to weak internal demand in 
peripheral countries during this period. 
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evolution of unemployment”); and external imbalances (the evolution of current account and net 
investment positions of Member States; real effective exchange rates; export market shares); changes 
in price and cost developments”. It is a bottom-up approach where the observation of “a small number 
of relevant, practical, simple, measurable and available macroeconomic and macrofinancial indicators” 
(Regulation No 1176/2011, Art. 4.2) will provide an accurate picture of various possible vulnerabilities, 
without explicitly linking them within a comprehensive macroeconomic framework. 
 
The empirical analysis provided in Annex A shows that the main scoreboard indicators cover well the 
two dimensions of macroeconomic imbalances, although some indicators (export shares, real effective 
exchange rates, unit labour costs) appear to measure more internal than external imbalances. As such, 
the distinction between external and internal has always been somewhat artificial, as the external data 
usually reflect internal developments in comparison to trading partners. 
 
Alternatively, it is possible to assess macroeconomic imbalances through a top-down approach that 
summarizes all imbalances (internal and external) in just one measure of real exchange-rate 
misalignments. The most widely used measure relies on the FEER approach (Fundamental Equilibrium 
Exchange Rate, see Williamson, 1983). The FEER is defined as the theoretical exchange rate that would 
bring the external current account to a certain equilibrium level while assuming a closure of the output 
gap (through other, unspecified policy instruments). The various indicators of the scoreboard could 
have an impact on the exchange-rate misalignments through their effects on the output gap and/or 
directly on the current account. For instance, a higher fiscal deficit, other things equal, reduces the 
output gap and the current account. A rise in short-term unemployment generally coincides with a 
declining or negative output gap. Higher credit growth correlates with lower private savings (hence 
the current account), etc. 
 
The FEER approach has been used by Couharde et al. (2017b) to study currency misalignments within 
the euro area. The bottom line of the methodology is to combine a measure of internal imbalances (the 
output gap) and a measure of external imbalances (the current account) to end up in a single 
vulnerability indicator (the real exchange-rate misalignment). Interestingly, the European scoreboard 
is consistent with such approach, since its indicators can be mapped along two axes representing 
internal and external imbalances, respectively (see Annex A). This is not surprising, since the estimates 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate were also computed by the Commission before the Scoreboard 
was created (see European Commission, 2009).  
 
The thresholds that are used in the scoreboard may lead to weighting more heavily some indicators 
relative to others, compared to an econometric approach. One way of looking at this question is by 
comparing the scoreboard to the misalignments found through a FEER methodology.  
 
Figure 5 maps euro area countries in 2008 along two dimensions. The first dimension is the proportion 
of flashing scoreboard indicators.11 The second dimension is the absolute value of real exchange rate 
misalignments within the euro area.12 The scoreboard flashes well for Ireland, Spain and to a lesser 
extent for Portugal. Conversely, the exchange-rate misalignment flashes more for Greece and Cyprus, 
                                                             
11 We use proportions of flashing indicators rather than number of flashes because there are missing data in 2008, notably for 
new member states (see Annex A). 
12 The calculation is based on misalignments of broad indices with variable country weights, as provided by the CEPII-
EQCHANGE database. We calculate the euro area misalignment as the weighted sum of individual countries misalignments, 
where the weights are those of the ECB capital keys. Then, intra-euro area misalignments are calculated as the difference 
between country misalignments and euro misalignments. In the graph we consider the absolute value of the misalignments, 
hence overvaluations and undervaluations of the real exchange rates are considered similarly. This approach is consistent 
with the scoreboard that puts both lower and upper bounds for the current account, although the range is asymmetric and 
does not concern the output gap. 
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while Italy is clustered in the group of “safe” countries. Finally, the exchange-rate misalignment flashes 
for Finland and Slovakia, hence also for non-crisis countries. On the whole, the MIP-scoreboard seems 
to work pretty well prior to the 2010 sovereign crisis (Greece’s crisis was driven by fiscal developments 
which would have been flagged by the SGP). However, the comparison can be considered unfair, since 
the scoreboard was constructed in 2011 with a view to identify those imbalances that led to the 2010 
crisis. 
 
Figure 5: Euro area countries in 2008 along two measures of imbalances 
 
 
Source: Authors, based on the MIP scoreboard and on CEPII-EQCHANGE. 
 
 
Figure 6 plots the evolution of the average proportion of flashing indicators for all euro area countries 
together (unweighted averages), and the proportion of exchange-rate misalignments in excess of 4%, 
from 1999 to 2018. Although the levels of these two indicators cannot be compared, their variations 
over time are interesting.13 Over 2009-2018, the proportion of misaligned countries tends to increase, 
whereas the proportion of flashing scoreboard indicators tends to decrease. Hence there is a 
divergence of these two measures of misalignments over this period. Restricting the analysis to the 
share of countries with relative exchange rate overvaluation among the countries with misalignments, 
it can be observed that this measure of imbalances declines since 2014, which means that the increased 
proportion of misalignments comes from undervalued currencies. Due to its composition and 
thresholds, the scoreboard may have underweighted the problem of “undervalued countries”. This 
finding is consistent with the Commission’s assessment that “The MIP has been more successful in 
reducing current account deficits than it has been in reducing persistent and large current account 
surpluses” (European Commission, 2020a, p. 17). 
 
  
                                                             
13 It should be reminded however that some scoreboard indicators are missing until the mid-2000s, see Annex A. 
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Figure 6: Two measures of imbalances, Euro area countries, 1999-2018 
 
 
Source: Authors, based on the MIP scoreboard and on CEPII-EQCHANGE. 
 
3.2. The scoreboard as an early-warning system  
 
The role of the scoreboard is to help the European Commission in identifying cases where an in-depth 
analysis is warranted, in order to check whether the country is at risk (and/or whether it may cause a 
risk to the Union through spillover effects). Hence, the scoreboard is not used in a mechanical way, but 
rather as an alarm to raise the attention on a subset of countries. 
 
Although its role may have changed de facto in recent years, the scoreboard was introduced as an 
early-warning system (EWS).14 In this section, we study whether it could have alarmed the Commission 
appropriately over the 1999-2013 period. To do so, we construct a synthetic indicators that measures 
the proportion of the 14 main scoreboard indicators that are out of their “admitted range” for each 
country-year. We then construct a binary indicator whose value in year t is unity in case there is a crisis 
in t+1 or t+2, and zero otherwise.15 We define a crisis as an event when the country asks for financial 
assistance from the IMF and/or from the EFSF/ESM. We eliminate the subsequent years from the 
sample. The crises events are reported in Table 1. 
 
  
                                                             
14 According to the Regulation No 1176/2011, “the scoreboard shall be used as a tool to facilitate early identification and 
monitoring of imbalances” (Article 4(1)). 
15 This choice is standard in the literature. We alternatively constructed an advanced warning system that would ring 4 years 
ahead, but the results were worse than with only 2 years ahead, not to mention the problems raised by the last 
observations of the sample.  
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Table 1: Crisis events  
Country Crisis start year Country Crisis start year 
Ireland 2010 Portugal 2011 
Greece 2010 Hungary 2008 
Spain 2012 Romania 2009 
Latvia 2008   
Source: Authors, based on EFSF/ESM documents. 
 
Such an early-warning mechanism has to trade-off two types of risks: 
• The risk of missing a crisis (false negative, type I); 
• The risk of issuing a fake alarm (false positive, type II). 
 
Annex C details how the two types of errors can be weighted and how to interpret the results of the 
EWS. Looking at how the thresholds of each indicator of the scoreboard were set, Knedlik (2014) finds 
that the implicit weight of type I errors is 0.6 while that of type II errors is 0.4: this means that the 
European Commission puts more weight on not missing a crisis than on issuing a fake alarm. Relying 
on this weighting scheme, we can calculate the optimal threshold for the aggregate scoreboard 
indicator, i.e. the threshold above which an alarm will be issued. The threshold is optimal in the sense 
that it maximises the utility of the EWS, given the weights of type I and type II errors implicitly set by 
the Commission.  
 
We perform a simulation which shows that the optimal threshold is 42%: for each country, when more 
than 42% of the scoreboard indicators are flashing, then the scoreboard issues an alarm. For the 28 EU 
countries over the 1999-2016 period, the scoreboard then issues 129 alarms, 13 of which were followed 
by a crisis.16 Only three crises are missed, which means that 81.3% of the crises are correctly predicted 
(see Table 2, left columns). Although 89.9% of the alarms are fake, the results are acceptable, given the 
preference for avoiding missing crises. 
 
Table 2: In-sample performance of the scoreboard as an early-warning system  
(EU countries, 1-2 years ahead, 1999-2016) 
 
 Full scoreboard Simplified scoreboard 
Threshold 42% 21% 
Crisis No crisis Crisis No crisis 
Alarm 13 116 16 123 
No alarm 3 323 0 316 
Signal-to-noise ratio (A+D)/(C+B) 2.8 2.7 
% of correctly called crises A/(A+C) 81.3 100.0 
% of correctly called tranquil D/(B+D) 73.6 72.0 
% of false alarms (B/(A+B) 89.9 88.5 
% of false tranquil C/(C+D) 0.9 0.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. A: alarm/crisis; B: alarm/no crisis; C: no alarm/crisis; D: no alarm/no crisis. 
 
It could be asked, however, whether a smaller set of indicators could do a similar job in predicting crises. 
As discussed previously, the indicators of the scoreboard cover various aspects of internal and external 
imbalances. Some refer to stocks (stocks of debts, of unemployed); some to flows (of external current 
account, of employed or unemployed, of credit); some to price changes (percent changes in real 
effective exchange rates, unit labour costs or of house prices). However, the empirical analysis 
presented in Annex A suggests that some of the scoreboard indicators seem to carry similar 
                                                             
16 The total number of observations is 455 instead of 28x18=504 because we have deleted all the observations after the start 
of the crises. 
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information in a way that is not always obvious. We now study the performance of a simplified 
scoreboard that would be reduced to only six indicators, based on what the empirical analysis extracts 
as variables with clearly different information content: current account, net international investment 
position, change in unit labour costs, credit growth, government debt and unemployment.17 The 
results based on the same preferences for type I and type II errors are reported in Table 2 (right 
columns). With a threshold of 21%, we are able to correctly call 100% of the crises without increasing 
the proportion of false alarms. 
 
This simple exercise suggests that a somewhat streamlined scoreboard may perform no worse than 
the complete one in its task to flag possible risks requiring in-depth analysis. 
 
 
 CONSISTENCY 
An important question is whether the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) given in the context 
of the European Semester are consistent both with recommendations given by international 
institutions and internally across policy areas and across countries. We aim to at least tentatively assess 
to what extent the given recommendations would actually be helpful in reducing imbalances, if 
implemented.  
We start by mapping the classification of countries in relation to the scoreboard. We then analyse the 
consistency of this classification with the CSRs and the consistency of the CSRs themselves, both 
internal and external, by comparing recommendations given by the EU with those of the IMF and the 
OECD. Considering external consistency is important, because policy-makers in the individual countries 
receive recommendations from the two international institutions and the supranational EU. Although 
the CSRs are integrated in the EU “rule-based system” (see Hagelstam et al. 2019), the threat of 
sanctions is relatively small; hence de facto the difference may not appear so compelling. The CSRs may 
be more rigorous, since they are enshrined in law. Alternatively, since they are ultimately adopted by 
the Council, the CSRs may incorporate a dose of political self-restraint, especially when large Member 
States are at stake.  In any case, the comparison with other sources of recommendations is valuable, 
not to mention that if recommendations are contradictory, national policy-makers will find it easy to 
ignore them or choose to just opt for those that are politically most opportune (which are not 
necessarily those that would reduce imbalances).  
 
4.1. The MIP classification of countries  
We have seen above that in recent years the scoreboard may have tended to under-weigh external 
imbalances, or at least current-account surpluses. The MIP classification of imbalances does not derive 
mechanically from the scoreboard. In fact, the scoreboard is only a first trigger to proceed to a further 
in-depth investigation of imbalances. An empirical exercise based on the available observation since 
2012 is presented in Annex A (Table A2). It shows that countries tend to be classified as imbalanced or 
as excessively imbalanced when they have external deficits (current-account deficits, negative net 
investment positions) and internal deficits (high government debts, high unemployment). External 
surpluses and signs of overheating (credit growth, house price increases, increases in unit labour costs) 
                                                             
17 Alternatively, we have used the variation in house prices variable instead of credit growth. However the house price variable is not available 
for 1999 and 2000, and the subsequent EWS was less performing. Since credit growth is the core variable for macroprudential policies, 
we decided to select this variable as a measure of the financial cycle. 
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appear empirically to be less taken into account when making the classification. Since the MIP was 
introduced, few countries did flash for the private credit flow indicator. However, house prices did flash 
for 5 to 10 countries per year, while unit labour costs increased too rapidly almost every year in four EU 
countries. 
In the 2019 vintage of the MIP, 15 EU countries were considered “without imbalances”, 10 with 
“imbalances” and 3 with “excessive imbalances” (Table 3). Figures 7 and 8 show how these three 
categories of countries differed in terms of the 14 main scoreboard indicators (for readability, we 
separate debt indicators from other indicators). In 2019, based on the 2018 scoreboard, the countries 
considered experiencing excessive imbalances on average differentiate themselves through lower net 
international investment positions, higher private and especially public debts, lower current accounts, 
higher unemployment, but also lower-than-average growth of unit labour costs and youth 
unemployment rates, and slower increase in house prices and liabilities in the financial sector.18 Hence, 
the 2019 vintage follows a similar pattern as in the previous years, as evidenced in Annex A (Table A2). 
Table 3: MIP classification in 2019 
MIP category Countries 
No imbalances Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Hungary, Poland, UK 
Imbalances France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Romania, Sweden 
Excessive imbalances Cyprus, Greece, Italy 
Source: European Commission. 
 
  
                                                             
18 These are averages over the different countries in each group. There are of course differences within each group. For 
instance, Italy displays a current-account surplus whereas Cyprus and Greece have current-account deficits. 
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Figure 7: Three debt indicators of the 2018 scoreboard  
Unweighted averages for the three MIP groups, in percentage point difference to EU28 
  
Source: MIP scoreboard. Variables: see Annex A. 
 
Figure 8: Other scoreboard indicators of the 2018 scoreboard 
Unweighted averages for the three MIP groups, in percentage point difference to EU28 
 
Source: MIP scoreboard. Variables: see Annex A. 
 
4.2. External consistency 
We now turn to the “external” consistency of the European Semester, by comparing the CSRs to the 
recommendations made by the IMF and by the OECD. Since we cannot systematically do such a 
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comparison for 28 EU countries, we concentrate here on the 2019 MIP vintage for the largest EU 
countries: Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK. These are the biggest 
countries in the EU and their combined GDP amounts to more than 70% of the EU’s GDP.  
Studying the largest countries is particularly relevant for macroeconomic imbalances in the EU. 
Recommendations are not only relevant for the countries themselves, but are likely to also have 
significant macro implications for the rest of the EU, due to the size of their economies. Consistency of 
recommendations given to large countries with the overall assessment of the EU and the euro area 
economy is therefore particularly relevant. 
In 2019, the “Big5” euro area countries were all classified as with imbalances or with excessive 
imbalances (see Table 3), and they received all their recommendations under the MIP heading. In 
contrast, Poland and the UK (the “Big2”), which are not members of the euro area, were considered 
with no imbalances. Hence, the comparison between the Big5 and the Big2 will inform us about the 
MIP CSRs for imbalanced euro area countries. 
Figures 9 ranks the 32 policy areas identified by Esthathiou and Wolff (2019), depending on the number 
of recommendations received by the Big5 and the euro area in 2019 from the three institutions. The 
chart clearly outlines the focus of the three institutions on fiscal issues. They also insist very much on 
skills, R&D and competition, which are structural issues that would better fit the “integrated guidelines” 
heading. Macro-finance issues such the housing market, financial services or private indebtedness are 
ranked after structural issues, and they are often covered by only one or two of the three institutions.  
Figure 9: Number of recommendations received in 2019 by the Big5 + Euro area* 
  
* Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands. Euro area treated as an additional country. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on individual CSRs and IMF/OECD country reports. 
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Figure 10 provides the same ranking for our Big2 group (Poland and the UK). Unsurprisingly, the total 
number of recommendations is much less than for the Big5, and some areas are not covered. However, 
the focus on fiscal sustainability, skills, R&D and competition is similar. Hence, the contrast between 
MIP recommendations to euro area countries and non-MIP recommendations to non-euro area 
countries is not striking. The only sizeable difference is the presence of recommendations related to 
the financial sector for MIP countries, unlike non-MIP ones. However, in these areas, the 
recommendations coming from the MIP are less numerous than those stemming from the IMF or the 
OECD. 
 
Figure 10: Number of recommendations received in 2019 by Poland and the UK (Big2) 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on individual CSRs and IMF/OECD country reports. 
 
We now turn to the overlap between the three institutions for the same country sample. Figure 11 
reports the percentage of EU-CSR subcomponents that are in areas also covered by the IMF or the OECD 
in 2018 or 2019 (depending on the publication schedules). The overlap is very limited for the UK and, 
to a lesser extent, for the euro area and the Netherlands. Conversely, the overlap reaches 88% with both 
institutions for Spain, denoting great convergence of analysis.  
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Figure 11: Percentage of EU-CSR subcomponents that overlap with IMF or OECD in 2019 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on individual CSRs and IMF/OECD country/Article IV reports (2019 or 2018). 
 
Table D2 in Annex D summarizes the recommendations given to Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland and the UK in 2019 or 2018 (when such report was not published in 2019 by the 
IMF or the OECD).  
The first point to note in the comparison is that the focus of the three institutions is somewhat different. 
OECD recommendations have less of a focus on macroeconomics and instead tend to emphasise issues 
related to the labour market, product markets, education and the welfare state  (for example in Poland, 
education and competition policy are highlighted strongly). The IMF, on the other hand, has a stronger 
focus on macro issues and emphasises financial matters, if compared to the EU recommendation. In 
particular, the IMF often makes recommendations that are directed at macro-prudential policies. The 
IMF also mentions clear bank restructuring and reform needs in Germany and Spain. The Commission, 
in contrast, does not mention macro-prudential policies and less frequently relates to banks (except for 
Italy). This is understandable, since macro-prudential policy is beyond the direct remits of the 
Commission. It is however problematic, as macro-prudential policy is a key instrument to prevent 
financial crises or at least limit the damage created by those crises. It is also problematic, as the MIP 
regulation explicitly encourages policy makers to make cross-references to the ESRB, which is in charge 
of macro-prudential recommendations. 
The second point to note is that there is quite some consistency across the institutions, but details are 
not fully aligned. The IMF is the only institution giving a strong recommendation on bank restructuring 
in Germany. It does not mention public debt in Italy, while this is one of the key issues for the EU. 
Meanwhile, only the Commission mentions corruption as something needing to be addressed in Italy. 
For the Netherlands, the recommendations given by the three institutions look less consistent: while 
the IMF mentions fiscal space as a source of growth, this is not mentioned by the OECD. While the EU 
emphasizes public investment, the OECD talks of reducing the marginal tax rate on labour income. The 
EU recommendations themselves are clear, but there are some inconsistencies. For instance, the EU 
blames the large current-account surplus but recommends reducing the debt bias and debt burden of 
households. Since the current accounts is identical to the sum of public and private net savings, 
reducing dissaving in the household sector (through reducing their mortgage debt) will likely increase 
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the current-account surplus. Overall, though, there are no major inconsistencies in the sense that one 
institution was recommending one thing and another one the opposite. 
In 2019, three EU countries were considered to be in excessive macroeconomic imbalances: Italy, 
Greece and Cyprus. Comparing the CSRs to either OECD or IMF recommendations is interesting since 
the “excessive imbalances” category is the last one before possible sanctions. The recommendations 
to Italy are broadly consistent across the three institutions and not very specific to macroeconomic 
imbalance, except for both the EU and the IMF mentioning the labour cost and banks’ non-performing 
loans. For Greece, both the IMF and the OECD give recommendations on social policies, which the EU 
does not do. The IMF also calls for more transparency, through enhancing the quality of the judicial 
system and speeding up anti-corruption reforms in Greece, which is not in the CSRs nor in the OECD 
recommendations. Meanwhile, on Cyprus, the EU clearly wants aggressive tax planning to be 
addressed, while the IMF calls for efforts to reduce money laundering, but there is considerable overlap 
when it comes to the reform of the public sector. Both institutions formulate several recommendations 
concerning the financial sector. 
On the whole, the IMF seems to incorporate recommendations that go in similar directions as the MIP-
CSRs, although both sets of recommendations also cover structural issues. The OECD is less prone to 
address macroeconomic policy issues in its recommendations. One good illustration is the common 
recommendation of the EU and of the IMF, but not of the OECD, to promote higher wage growth in 
Germany. Such recommendation can only be understood from a macroeconomic imbalance point of 
view. 
 
4.3. Internal consistency 
We now turn to the consistency of the CSRs with the recommendations made to the Euro area, based 
again on the 2019 vintage. That year, the recommendations to the euro area distinguished between 
those Member States with an external deficit, which were recommended to raise their competitiveness, 
and those with a “large” external surplus, which were asked to “strengthen the conditions that 
support wage growth in a manner that respects the role of social partners” and to “implement 
measures that foster investment”. All were recommended to shift taxes away from labour (see the 
synthesis of the CSRs in Table D3 of Annex D). 
How did these recommendations to the euro area “trickle down” to the CSRs? Starting first with the 
countries with current account surpluses, we find that the link between the assessment that a country 
needs to boost demand and the policy recommendation is weak: 
• Sometimes they are not specific enough. Both Germany and the Netherlands were asked to 
“Strengthen the conditions that support higher wage growth, while respecting the role of the 
social partners”, and Germany needed also to “Shift taxes away from labour to sources less 
detrimental to inclusive and sustainable growth”. The minimum wage and the remunerations 
in the public sector were not mentioned. And the “less detrimental” tax bases were also left 
unspecified. 
• Sometimes the link between the recommendation and the objective of boosting demand is 
unclear. While it is true that the recommendations to Germany to boost private and public 
investment would be increasing demand (to the extent that it does not come as a substitute 
for consumption), shifting labour taxation to indirect taxes would have unclear effects on 
demand. In addition, such a shift would aggravate the relative divergence of unit labour costs 
across the EU. In 2007, Germany cut the labour wedge by around 0.5 percentage point while 
increasing the normal VAT rate from 16 to 19%. The same year, the gross saving rate of 
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households increased from 16.9% to 17.3% of disposable income, the latter having arguably 
increased (source: Ameco). The case of the Netherlands is even worse as the CSRs are about 
reducing the debt bias for households, which would likely increase net savings rather than 
reducing them. Improving the second (funded) pillar of the Dutch pension system would also 
stimulate households’ savings. 
 
Turning to a deficit country – France – we also find the recommendations to be loosely related to the 
need to raise external competitiveness, except for the recommendation to reduce taxes on production 
and to adjust the fiscal deficit (but the latter recommendation is already embodied in the SGP). Fast-
rising leverage in both the household and in the corporate sectors observed in recent years is not 
mentioned. Actually, the keyword “leverage” is absent from the whole document, whereas “debt” is 
only associated to the government. 
  
Finally, an interesting case is Italy, which is in “excessive imbalances” despite its current-account 
surplus. The recommendations to Italy concentrate on fiscal adjustment (which is likely to increase the 
external surplus), productivity and the labour market (with the objective of boosting supply and 
reducing the unemployment rate). Since the external surplus of Italy is not “large” by German and 
Dutch standards, these recommendations are perfectly aligned with those to the Euro area. A boost in 
Italian GDP growth would represent a central pillar in improving the strength and resilience of the euro 
area. Interestingly, the CSRs to Italy include the need to further strengthen the banking sector. 
The difficulty to match recommendations to countries and to the euro area is neither new nor specific 
to the EU. Already Pisani-Ferry et al (2011) show that pre-crisis, IMF surveillance of euro area countries 
was missing the systemic dimension of sharing a common currency. It was wrongly assumed that a 
balance of payment crises could not occur within a currency area. Furthermore, demand and supply 
externalities that operate across borders were broadly ignored in the recommendations given to 
countries prior to the crisis.  
The recommendations at the euro area level are not clearly broken down to recommendations to 
national policy-makers. The EU obviously faces the problem that it has no “euro area” institution other 
than the Eurogroup to whom it can address recommendations. One could therefore argue that 
recommendations need to be fairly generic. However, generic recommendations to “no specific 
addressee” are unlikely to yield many results. It is crucial that they become specific enough so that the 
countries represented in the Eurogroup understand what practical recommendation is given to them. 
In our reading, the IMF manages this problem better by now. In fact, the IMF document clearly 
highlights countries with high public debt that should be fiscally prudent, while countries with low 
debt should invest. We do not see the same clarity with the EU’s euro area recommendations. The 
recommendation to the euro area comes with an annex with country detail. However this annex 
presents some benchmarking rather than a consistent convergence strategy. The CSRs replicate this 
lack of vision of the convergence: each country is supposed to contribute the same way to the common 
objective (represented by the recommendations to the euro area), with only general considerations 
depending on the external current account. 
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 GOVERNANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MIP 
5.1. Summary of the results 
In this paper, we have analysed the outcomes of the EU’s macroeconomic imbalances procedure, with 
a special focus on the euro area. A number of key results stands out.  
First, we document that the effectiveness of the MIP has been quite limited, if measured in terms of 
CSRs implementation. Implementation rates of recommendations at the national level tend to be low 
and in the last years there has been little difference between countries with excessive imbalances and 
those without imbalances. Right after the crisis, implementation rates were still higher in countries with 
excessive imbalances. It is likely that these higher implementation rates are not driven by the stronger 
legal framework, when it comes to recommendations given in the context of excessive imbalances, but 
rather to the macroeconomic and financial market situation (Efstathiou and Wolff 2019). We also show 
that imbalances in all countries (except the UK) decreased from 2013 to 2018, as measured in the 
scoreboard. However, there is no systematic relation to the degree to which countries have 
implemented their policy recommendations.  
Second, we study the scoreboard in some detail. We find that, over the 2012-2018 period, the 
information pointing to possible overheating or surpluses (e.g. house prices) receives relatively little 
weight when it comes to determining whether a country is in imbalance. Instead, the MIP is more likely 
to point to countries with high current account deficits, high unemployment and high government 
debt. All in all, several variables of the scoreboard seem to convey similar information, whereas not all 
the dimensions of the scoreboard are fully accounted for in the MIP classifications. 
Third, we have analysed how well the scoreboard serves as an early warning mechanism for crises 
following next year or two years later. Like any early warning mechanism, policy-makers need to trade 
off type-one and type-two errors. We show that it is possible to calibrate the early-warning system so 
that it would have warned of most of the crises. This is at the cost of many false alarms. To the extent 
that the scoreboard is not used directly, but that it rather triggers in-depth analyses, we think that this 
is a reasonable approach. However, we then document that the Commission could improve the 
scoreboard’s capacity to serve as an early warning indicator by reducing the number of variables in the 
scoreboard. 
Finally, we have checked the consistency of EU recommendations with those of the IMF/OECD and the 
euro area internal consistency. The three institutions cover a large array of policies and are broadly 
consistent. However, the IMF is more prone than the OECD to deliver recommendations concerning 
macroeconomic policies, which makes it closer to the CSRs. However, the CSRs are less clear on the 
financial sector than the IMF is. The euro area internal consistency is sometimes missing. The EU finds 
it difficult to give clear recommendations to countries with high current accounts surplus, and the 
connection to euro area recommendations is plagued by the very generic feature of the latter. Overall, 
our reading is that the exercise keeps still largely a country-by-country approach. We consider this to 
be especially problematic for euro area countries (see e.g. Ragot, 2017). 
5.2. How to improve the governance 
As already highlighted by several reports (e.g. Alcidi and Gros, 2017; ECA, 2018; Hallerberg et al 2017; 
Bénassy-Quéré, 2015, 2017, 2018), the European semester suffers from governance problems that have 
not been entirely solved by past reforms. Here we concentrate on the MIP. 
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Unlike the SGP or the macro-prudential policy,19 the MIP does not rely on a small set of indicators which 
could raise national awareness. As a matter of fact, most policy-makers at national level have some 
knowledge about the fiscal rules (although they often confuse the preventive and corrective arms of 
the SGP). Conversely, the MIP is mostly ignored at policymaking level, but also at expert level. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that even the knowledge on the MIP is not widespread in academia or at 
expert level (e.g. within national productivity boards). Bénassy-Quéré (2015) argues that the current 
account could be used as a flagship indicator in order to raise awareness at national level. We have seen 
that a streamlined scoreboard would do better than the present one as an early-warning system. Since 
an alert based on the scoreboard is always followed by an in-depth analysis, there is really a case here 
to simplify the scoreboard.  
A second problem with the MIP is that, although financial imbalances are part of the scoreboard, and 
although MIP classifications do take these imbalances into account, the CSRs often cannot be specific, 
since they point to macro-prudential policies that are monitored through a different, independent 
process. The Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 states that: “It [the Commission] shall, in particular, take 
into account: […] any warnings or recommendations from the ESRB on systemic risks addressed to, or 
being relevant to, the Member State under review. The confidentiality regime of the ESRB shall be 
observed” (Art. 5.2 on in-depth reviews). However, ESRB’s views and recommendations do not 
necessarily coincide with the timeframe of the European semester. In July 2019, for instance, the ESRB 
expressed its worry about the real estate market in Belgium that could be a source of systemic risk, and 
recommended borrower-based measures. However, the country report issued by the Commission for 
Belgium in February 2019 praised the decisions already taken the previous years by the national macro-
prudential authorities and classified the country as without imbalances. In September 2016, the ESRB 
had issued warnings to 11 countries concerning residential real estate: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Table E1 in Annex E studies how these recommendations were followed-up in the next European 
semester. While it was the case for the Netherlands, Sweden and to a certain extent the United 
Kingdom, in the other countries there was no corresponding CSR, even in Finland that was considered 
to be with imbalances that year. 
We believe that the MIP process and the macro-prudential process need to be better integrated – while 
respecting the independence of the respective authorities, consistent with the MIP regulation. For 
instance, the ESRB could issue its own country-specific recommendations at the same time as the 
European semester’s CSRs, and a mixed delegation from the Commission and from the ESRB could have 
a yearly discussion with national macro-prudential authorities on these recommendations. As already 
recommended by the ECA (2018), the MIP recommendations could themselves focus on policy actions 
that have a clear effect on imbalances in the short and medium term.20 
A third problem of the MIP is that, despite efforts to connect the CSRs to a clear diagnosis for the euro 
area as a whole, the MIP exercise remains very much a country-by-country exercise. This feature is 
                                                             
19 The SGP relies on a number of simple fiscal thresholds: a financial deficit not exceeding 3% (corrective arm threshold); a 
structural deficit not exceeding 1% or 0.5% (depending on the debt ratio) for the preventive arm (medium-term objectives). 
As for macro-prudential policy, decisions on the counter-cyclical capital buffer are supposed to be taken under “guided 
discretion” based on the credit-to-GDP gap (“Basel gap”), see CRD IV Art. 136. 
20 “The Commission should systematically link MIP-CSRs to macroeconomic imbalances. The proposed measures should be 
sufficiently detailed, and should focus on policy actions to reduce imbalances in the short-to-medium term. Wherever 
possible, the Commission should make ex-ante and ex-post assessments of the impact of policy actions on imbalances” (ECA 
2018, p. 8). 
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especially detrimental within a monetary union: by insisting on reducing current-account deficits and 
limiting nominal growth of unit labour costs, the MIP may actually create a deflationary bias in the euro 
area, especially if higher nominal growth in the surplus countries is not achieved. A start would be to 
change the scoreboard and define more clearly that relative imbalances in the euro area are the core 
issue of concern. This would require using unit labour cost developments relative to the rest of the euro 
area and calculating the real effective exchange rate against other euro area countries rather than 
against the United States or Japan.21 It would also involve re-insisting on the fact that the MIP is not 
about growth or fiscal sustainability but rather about imbalances. To do so, the recommendation to 
the euro area could include a section explaining the strategy to reduce existing imbalances, the 
contribution of each member state being specified. This could also help addressing the difficulty in 
having an impact on surplus countries, as acknowledged by the European Commission’s review 
(2020a). Next, the MIP could involve the recently created national productivity councils. These 
institutions need to coordinate their methodologies and diagnoses in order to concentrate on 
convergence and eliminate the risk of a “race-to-the-bottom”. Like macro-prudential authorities, 
productivity councils could have a yearly consultation with the Commission, ahead of the publication 
of the CSRs. In turn, national productivity councils could be asked to provide an independent 
assessment of yearly Reform programmes (like national fiscal institutions are asked to assess national 
Stability programmes). Involving both national bodies (macro-prudential and productivity councils) in 
the MIP process could contribute to increase national ownership of the process. 
A fourth problem of the MIP is its relationship with the SGP. While the objective of the SGP is fiscal 
sustainability, that of the MIP is more broadly reducing macroeconomic imbalances. In some cases the 
two objectives overlap; in other cases (countries with high current-account surplus), the MIP may want 
to provide recommendations on top of existing fiscal rules. This is difficult, as the SGP is more binding 
than the MIP in the sense that public finance sustainability is a core part of the EU treaties. Some CSRs 
try to circumvent this difficulty through concentrating on public investment instead of public spending 
as a whole, but a country may respond by reallocating public spending with little effect on the 
macroeconomic stance. Fiscal policy is the area where a tighter connection with the recommendations 
to the euro area is required, but where also political resistance is the biggest. Ultimately, this problem, 
which has been recognized by the European Commission (2020a), requires more political ownership at 
the national level. 
Finally, we would argue that communication needs to be radically overhauled. National policy-makers 
are often totally unaware of the entire European Semester process. Communication is often done in 
very technical and administrative form – failing to trigger interest in national debates. The Commission 
should simplify language, increase clarity and ensure that the recommendations are launched in the 
national context. Moreover, the staff of DG ECFIN should be much more present in national debates 
and conferences than currently, on top of interacting both with national productivity councils and 
national macro-prudential authorities.22 The clarity of the link between national recommendations and 
the fact that a country is a member of the euro area (and therefore is subject to constraints) needs to 
also be improved. 
 
                                                             
21 These indicators are already calculated as “auxiliary”. They should just replace the two “main” ones, with appropriate 
thresholds. 
22 Current discussions with the governments are not enough, since they are not open to the public and there are no press 
records. 
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Box 1: Summary of the recommendations 
 
1. Streamline the scoreboard around a few meaningful indicators; check that they are geared towards 
intra-euro area imbalances rather than performance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
2. In the recommendation to the euro area, include a section explaining the strategy to reduce 
imbalances, the contribution of each member state being specified. 
3. Focus MIP-CSRs to policy actions that can have direct effect on imbalances. Involve national macro-
prudential authorities and national productivity councils; coordinate the timetable of the European 
semester with that of ESRB’s recommendations; 
4. Simplify the language and further involve the Commission into national policy discussions. 
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ANNEX A: SCOREBOARD AND MIP CLASSIFICATION 
At the beginning of the procedure, the Commission publishes a so-called “MIP scoreboard” for each EU 
country. As of 2019, the scoreboard includes 14 main indicators and 28 auxiliary indicators. The 14 
indicators are listed in Table A1. Based on the scoreboard, the European Commission writes an Alert 
mechanism report that justifies whether a particular country needs an “in-depth” analysis. After the 
latter are carried out, the Member States are finally classified into four categories: “no imbalances” (a 
category which also includes those countries that were not subject to an in-depth analysis), 
“imbalances”, “excessive imbalances”, and “excessive imbalances with corrective action”, the latter 
category being the anteroom of sanctions for euro area countries.23 Since the introduction of the MIP, 
no country has ever been classified in the last category. 
 
Table A1: MIP Scoreboard: 14 main indicators 
Name Definition Threshold(s) 
CA 3-year backward moving average of the current account balance as 
percent of GDP 
-4%/+6% 
NIIP Net international investment position as percent of GDP -35% 
XSHARE 5-year percentage change of export market shares measured in values -6% 
ULC 3-year percentage change in nominal unit labour cost  +9%*/+12% 
REER 3-year percentage change of the real effective exchange rates based on 
HICP/CPI deflators, relative to 41 other industrial countries 
-/+5%* 
-/+11% 
PDEBT private sector debt (consolidated) in % of GDP 133% 
CREDIT private sector credit flow in % of GDP   14% 
HOUSE year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat 
consumption deflator 
+6% 
GDEBT general government sector debt in % of GDP 60% 
UNEMPL 3-year backward moving average of unemployment rate 10% 
FLIAB year-on-year changes in total financial sector liabilities 16.5% 
ACTIVITY 3-year change in p.p. of the activity rate -0.2 pp 
LTUNEMPL 3-year change in p.p. of the long-term unemployment rate +0.5 pp 
YUNEMPL 3-year change in p.p. of the youth unemployment rate +2 pp 
* Euro-area specific threshold 
 
The scoreboard has been subject to several adjustment since its introduction. The first change was 
made in 2013, when European Commission added the “financial sector liability indicator”.24 The year 
after, statistical definitions of real effective exchange rate, private sector debt and credit flow indicators 
were revised and some auxiliary indicators were added. In 2016, three employment indicators (activity 
                                                             
23 Before 2016, there were five categories instead of four. 
24 European Commission (2012). 
IPOL | Economic Governance Support Unit 
 
 38 PE 645.710 
rate, long-term unemployment and youth unemployment) were moved from auxiliary to main 
indicators.25 
Auxiliary indicators are not main focus of the MIP as they do not have thresholds, which means that 
they never flash. Their number and technical details have changed over time as well. The latest 
technical revision was in 2019, when two indicators were redefined and two of them were replaced.26 
 
Here we use the interactive database compiled by Eurostat for the 14 main indicators considered in the 
2019 vintage of the MIP for EU28 countries. From 2008, the dataset is complete. Before 2008, there are 
some gaps in the data especially for the early years (1999-2002). The most obvious batch of missing 
data pertains to the house price index (HOUSE), for which there are no values for 1999 or 2000. For this 
indicator, the values are completed only from 2007. Values on long-term unemployment (LTUNEMPL) 
are also missing for many Member States in the earlier period; the dataset is complete from 2007. In 
contrast, for the following indicators there are a maximum of 4 missing values for all countries during 
the examined time period (1999-2018) chiefly in the first two years: nominal unit labour costs (ULC), 
real effective exchange rate (REER), private sector debt (PDEBT), private sector credit flows (CREDIT), 
general government debt (GDEBT) and financial sector liabilities (FLIAB). In terms of geographical 
distribution, Spain has the most complete dataset (the only missing values are the house price index 
for 1999 and 2000). The bulk of the missing data is concentrated in certain “new” Member States, 
specifically Cyprus and Malta and to a lesser extent Slovakia. Data from the period prior to them joining 
the EU (2004) and euro (2008, 2009) are partially incomplete.  
We run a Principal component analysis (PCA) on this dataset, pooling all countries-years in a single, 
descriptive analysis. PCA allows summarizing a large number of indicators along a small number of 
linear combinations that are defined so as to capture as much variance as possible. We then perform 
the PCA on the correlation matrix in order to account for the different scales and variances of the 
indicators. Importantly, the PCA does not test the MIP itself, for two reasons. First, it covers a period 
where the MIP did not exist; second, it includes crisis countries even when they were not scrutinized by 
the MIP, when they were in adjustment programmes. The PCA exercise rather aims at presenting the 
underlying logic of the scoreboard based on a purely statistical analysis. 
In the PCA, each component is a linear combination of the different variables. The components are then 
ranked in declining order of variance: the first component is the linear combination of the 14 variables 
that captures the highest possible variance, hence it is the most discriminatory combination of the 14 
variables. Figure A1 plots the eigenvalues of the 14 components in declining order. Because we are 
working on correlations, the average is unity. The chart suggests retaining the first four components of 
the PCA. Taken together, they explain 65% of the variance of the sample.  
 
  
                                                             
25 European Commission (2015). 
26 European Commission (2018). 
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Figure A1: Eigenvalues of the components 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table A2 reports the correlation of each variable with each of the first four components. All correlations 
above 50% are indicated in bold. The first component (Comp1) is positively correlated to several 
variables that point to a booming economy: rise in export market shares, rise in unit labour costs, high 
credit flows, rise in house prices and in financial sector liabilities. It is negatively correlated to variables 
pointing to a slack: rise in government debt, rise in long-term and in youth unemployment. 
 
The second component (Comp2) is highly and positively correlated to the two external variables: the 
current accounts and the net international investment position. It is negatively correlated to 
unemployment. 
 
The third component (Comp3) is negatively correlated to unemployment and positively correlated 
(although by less than 50%) to the rise in unit labour costs. The fourth component (Comp4) is positively 
correlated to private debt and credit. Hence, components 3 and 4 do not add much novel information 
compared to component 1 that already opposes unemployment to various elements of booming or 
overheating. In the following, we concentrate the analysis on the first two components. 
 
The table clearly defines two dimensions of macroeconomic imbalances: 
• The internal dimension (Comp1), which opposes rising house prices, credit, financial liabilities, 
unit labour costs and export shares (positive correlations) to high government debt and rising 
unemployment (negative correlations); 
• The external dimension (Comp2), which opposes current-account surpluses and high net 
investment position (positive correlations) to high unemployment (negative correlation).27 
 
 
  
                                                             
27 Unemployment is not an external variable. However, as argued by Williamson (1983), the current account needs to be “adjusted” for 
unemployment (or for the output gap) in order to be assessed in terms of “external imbalances”: higher unemployment makes a 
current-account deficit more problematic as the deficit will increase when employment recovers. This is exactly what we have in 
Table 3. 
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Table A2. Scoreboard indicators: correlations with first four components 
 
Name 
Definition Comp1 
(28.2%) 
Comp2 
(15.2%) 
Comp3 
(12.2%) 
Comp4 
(9.7%) 
CA 3-year backward moving average of the 
current account balance as percent of GDP 
-0.2165 0.818 -0.1402 -0.1824 
NIIP Net international investment position as 
percent of GDP 
0.1883 0.7809 0.2555 -0.252 
XSHARE 5-year percentage change of export market 
shares measured in values 
0.6476 -0.3584 -0.0824 -0.0343 
ULC 3-year percentage change in nominal unit 
labour cost  
0.5949 -0.3042 0.4876 -0.2077 
REER 3-year percentage change of the real effective 
exchange rates based on HICP/CPI deflators, 
relative to 41 other industrial countries 
0.4664 -0.3635 0.2227 -0.1977 
PDEBT private sector debt (consolidated) in % of GDP -0.3087 0.3239 0.257 0.5673 
CREDIT private sector credit flow in % of GDP 0.5214 0.1343 0.2057 0.5937 
HOUSE year-on-year changes in house prices relative 
to a Eurostat consumption deflator 
0.583 0.2303 -0.4703 0.3066 
GDEBT general government sector debt in % of GDP -0.6441 -0.0747 -0.4193 0.0359 
UNEMPL 3-year backward moving average of 
unemployment rate 
-0.454 -0.505 -0.5223 0.1405 
FLIAB year-on-year changes in total financial sector 
liabilities 
0.6518 -0.0206 0.0464 0.4971 
ACTIVITY 3-year change in p.p. of the activity rate 0.381 0.0399 -0.003 -0.3229 
LTUNEMPL 3-year change in p.p. of the long-term 
unemployment rate 
-0.7447 -0.1254 0.4143 0.1723 
YUNEMPL 3-year change in p.p. of the youth 
unemployment rate 
-0.6476 -0.2098 0.6186 0.0818 
Country classification (2012-2018) 
IMBAL 0 “no imbalances”; 1 “imbalances; 2 “excessive 
imbalances” 
-0.5579 -0.2349 -0.2575 0.2560 
 
Notes: in bold: correlations of more than 50%; first line, in parenthesis: percentage of total variance captured by each 
component. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure A2 presents the loadings for the first two components, i.e. the mapping of the 14 scoreboard 
indicators in terms of the first two components defined in Box 1. For instance, the current account (ca) 
has a negative coordinate on the horizontal axis and a positive coordinate on the vertical axis. This 
means that a country-year with higher current-account weighs negatively in terms of the first 
component (i.e. it shows relatively weak aggregate demand); it weighs positively in terms of the second 
component (i.e. it shows relatively strong external position). 
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The chart also uncovers the proximity of three groups of variables: 
• The three unemployment variables and the government debt variable, in the south-west of the 
graph; 
• The activity rate, credit growth, house prices and financial sector liability in the right hand-side 
• Unit labour costs, export shares and the real effective exchange rate variation in the south-east. 
The graph does not provide any interpretation in terms of causality. It only suggests that, in terms of 
internal and external imbalances, the different variables within each group conveys similar information 
for our country-time sample. 
 
Figure A2: Components loadings 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
As already mentioned, the counterfactual analysis of the scoreboard cannot directly be interpreted in 
terms of the MIP. However, it is interesting to study how the MIP classification (since 2012) gets into 
this mapping of the scoreboard. To do so, we calculate the correlation between each component and 
a trinomial variable (IMBAL) representing the MIP classification of countries: 0 for “no imbalances”, 1 for 
“imbalances” and 2 for “excessive imbalances”. The correlation is calculated over 2012-2018. The results 
are reported in the last line of Table A2. The MIP classification is negatively correlated to the first 
component: imbalances are more often declared when an economy is in a slack (left hand-side of 
Figure 9) than in a boom/overheating country/period (right hand-side). The imbalances variable is also 
negatively correlated to the second component (external imbalances), although the correlation is 
much lower. Hence, over the period the MIP has concentrated on countries with external deficits and 
internal crises. This can be understood given the period when the MIP was introduced. However, the 
MIP needs also to pay attention to the right hand-side of the graph (overheating) and higher part of 
the graph (external surpluses) if it wants to act in a pre-emptive ways and to foster nominal 
convergence within the euro area. 
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ANNEX B: LABOUR MARKET REFORMS 
Figure B1 compares the implementation of labour-market recommendations (LM) to the general 
implementation rates of country-specific recommendations. We report the record across all EU 
countries into “no progress”, “limited progress”, “some progress”, “substantial progress” and “fully 
addressed. 
 
Figure B1: Implementation of CSRs: labour-market reforms (LM) vs all CSRs  
  
  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Esthathiou and Wolff (2019) database. 
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ANNEX C: THE EARLY-WARNING PERFORMANCE OF THE 
SCOREBOARD 
 
As evidenced in Annex A, the logic of the scoreboard is very much that of an early-warning system 
(EWS). Here, we try to evaluate its performance to alert policy-makers of the rising probability of a crisis 
one or two years ahead. To do so, we follow the literature which aggregates different indicators into a 
single alarm system that will flash when exceeding a certain threshold. In our case, the single indicator 
is the proportion of main indicators flashing, hence it ranges from 0 to 100%. 
 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to construct an EWS that performs well both in terms of signaling 
future crises and in terms of not issuing false alarms: if we want to avoid type I errors (hence not to 
miss crises), we need to select a low threshold, but then there will be many false alarms. Conversely, if 
we want to avoid type II errors (hence not have too many false alarms), we need to set a high threshold, 
but then we will miss some crises. The standard way of modelling this trade-off is through maximizing 
the following utility function: 
 
𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃) = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝜃𝜃, 1 − 𝜃𝜃) − �𝜃𝜃 𝐶𝐶
𝐴𝐴+𝐶𝐶
+ (1 − 𝜃𝜃) 𝐵𝐵
𝐵𝐵+𝐷𝐷
�      (B.1) 
 
Where A, B, C, D are the number of occurrences of, respectively, accurate alarms, false alarms, accurate 
no alarms, false no alarms (false tranquil). This signalling approach is summarized in Table C1. A and D 
represent the (accurate) “signals” whereas C and B represent the “noise”. Early approaches consisted 
just in minimizing the noise-to-signal ratio (C+B)/(A+D). More recent research relies Equation (B.1), 
where θ represents the weight of type I errors and (1-θ) is the weight of type II errors: the higher θ, the 
more type I errors reduce utility U, hence the higher the concern about missing a crisis.28 
 
Table C1: The signalling and noise matrix 
 Crisis No crisis 
Alarm rings A B 
No alarm C D 
Source: adapted from Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
 
Since it is not applied mechanically, it is possible to argue that the purpose of the scoreboard is to ring 
the alarm quite frequently in order to minimize the risk of missing crises, even though most of the time 
the alarm will not be followed by a crisis. Along this line, we can set θ=1: the Commission only wants 
to avoid missing a crisis (type I errors). 
 
Looking at how the thresholds of each indicator of the scoreboard were set, Knedlik (2014) finds that 
the implicit value of θ is 0.6 on average: the Commission weighs more type I than type II errors, but still 
it does not want to get too many type II errors. In a second step, we set θ=0.6. 
 
The results are reported in Table C2. They show that it is possible to predict 100% of the crises based 
on the scoreboard, provided the threshold is set at 28%. However there is a very high proportion 
(93.9%) of false alarms and the signal-to-noise ratio is low (0.8, meaning more noise than signal). 
 
Conversely, when the weights of type-I and type-II errors are more balanced (θ=0.6), the optimal 
threshold is 42%. The proportion of false alarms is reduced to 89.9%, but the proportion of correctly 
                                                             
28 The first term in the utility function allows for consistency of the utility when θ=0 or 1 while ensuring that the utility function rises with 
signal-to-noise ratios. See Alessi and Detken (2011). 
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called crises also falls from 100% (previous case) to only 81.3% here. Still, the signal-to-noise ratio is 
higher than in the previous case.29 
 
Table C2: In-sample performance of the scoreboard as an early-warning system  
(1-2 years ahead) 
 
 No type-I error  
(θ = 1) 
Higher weight on type-I 
errors (θ = 0.6) 
Optimal threshold* 28% 42% 
 Crisis No crisis Crisis No crisis 
Alarm 16 248 13 116 
No alarm 0 191 3 323 
Signal-to-noise ratio (A+D)/(C+B) 0.8 2.8 
% of correctly called crises A/(A+C) 100 81.3 
% of correctly called tranquil 
D/(B+D) 
43.5 73.6 
% of false alarms (B/(A+B) 93.9 89.9 
% of false tranquil C/(C+D) 0 0.9 
* Threshold that maximizes the utility function (B.1). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  
                                                             
29 Note that these various performances are “in-sample”. An out-of-sample test is not feasible in our case due to the limited number of 
crises. 
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ANNEX D: MIP 2019  
 
Table D1: Country-specific recommendations to countries in excessive imbalances in 2019 
 CSRs June 2019 
Greece 1. Achieve a sustainable economic recovery and tackle the excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances by continuing and completing reforms in line with the post-programme 
commitments given at the Eurogroup of 22 June 2018.  
2. Focus investment-related economic policy on sustainable transport and logistics, 
environmental protection, energy efficiency, renewable energy and 
interconnection projects, digital technologies, research and development, 
education, skills, employability, health, and the renewal of urban areas, taking into 
account regional disparities and the need to ensure social inclusion. 
Italy  
1. Ensure a nominal reduction of net primary government expenditure of 0.1% in 
2020, corresponding to an annual structural adjustment of 0.6% of GDP. Use 
windfall gains to accelerate the reduction of the general government debt ratio. 
Shift taxation away from labour, including by reducing tax expenditure and 
reforming the outdated cadastral values. Fight tax evasion, especially in the form of 
omitted invoicing, including by strengthening the compulsory use of e-payments 
including through lower legal thresholds for cash payments. Implement fully past 
pension reforms to reduce the share of pensions in public spending and create 
space for other social and growth-enhancing spending.  
2. Step up efforts to tackle undeclared work. Ensure that active labour market and 
social policies are effectively integrated and reach out notably to young people 
and vulnerable groups. Support women’s participation in the labour market 
through a comprehensive strategy, including through access to quality childcare 
and long-term care. Improve educational outcomes, also through adequate and 
targeted investment, and foster upskilling, including by strengthening digital skills. 
3. Focus investment-related economic policy on research and innovation, and the 
quality of infrastructure, taking into account regional disparities. Improve the 
effectiveness of public administration, including by investing in the skills of public 
employees, by accelerating digitalisation, and by increasing the efficiency and 
quality of local public services. Address restrictions to competition, particularly in 
the retail sector and in business services, also through a new annual competition 
law. 
4. Reduce the length of civil trials at all instances by enforcing and streamlining 
procedural rules, including those under consideration by the legislator and with a 
special focus on insolvency regimes. Improve the effectiveness of the fight against 
corruption by reforming procedural rules to reduce the length of criminal trials.  
5. Foster bank balance sheet restructuring, in particular for small and medium-sized 
banks, by improving efficiency and asset quality, continuing the reduction of non-
performing loans, and diversifying funding. Improve non-bank financing for 
smaller and innovative firms. 
 
Cyprus  
1. Adopt key legislative reforms to improve efficiency in the public sector, in particular 
as regards the functioning of the public administration and the governance of 
state-owned entities and local governments. Address features of the tax system 
that may facilitate aggressive tax planning by individuals and multinationals, in 
particular by means of outbound payments by multinationals.  
2. Facilitate the reduction of non-performing loans including by setting up an 
effective governance structure of the State-owned asset management company, 
taking steps to improve payment discipline and strengthening the supervision of 
the credit acquiring companies. Strengthen the supervision capacities in the non-
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bank financial sector, including by fully integrating the insurance and pension funds 
supervisors.  
3. Complete reforms aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the public employment 
services and reinforce outreach and activation support for young people. Deliver on 
the reform of the education and training system, including teacher evaluation, and 
increase employers' engagement and learners' participation in vocational 
education and training, and affordable childhood education and care. Take 
measures to ensure that the National Health System becomes operational in 2020, 
as planned, while preserving its long-term sustainability.  
4. Focus investment-related economic policy on sustainable transport, environment, 
in particular waste and water management, energy efficiency and renewable 
energy, digitalisation, including digital skills, and research and innovation, taking 
into account territorial disparities within Cyprus. Adopt legislation to simplify the 
procedures for strategic investors to obtain necessary permits and licences. 
Improve access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises, and resume the 
implementation of privatisation projects.  
5. Step up efforts to improve the efficiency of the judicial system, including the 
functioning of administrative justice and revising civil procedures, increasing the 
specialisation of courts and setting up an operational e-justice system. Take 
measures to strengthen the legal enforcement of claims and ensure reliable and 
swift systems for the issuance and transfer of title deeds and immovable property 
rights. Accelerate anti-corruption reforms, safeguard the independence of the 
prosecution and strengthen the capacity of the law enforcement.  
 
 
Source: CSRs 2019. 
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Table D 2: Comparison between CSRs and IMF/OECD recommendations 
Country CSRs IMF OECD 
Euro area Deepen the single market and 
EMU, improve the business 
environment and the quality of 
institutions, reduce external 
debt, boost competitiveness, 
public and private investment, 
fiscal buffers, shift taxes away 
from labour, educational 
outcomes, ALMPs, banking and 
capital market union 
Inflation adjustment, countries 
with high public debt – fiscal 
adjustment and stronger 
enforcement of fiscal rules, 
countries with fiscal space – 
investment, integration in the 
EU services sector, political 
agreement for risk reduction 
and sharing 
Gradually normalise 
monetary policy, reform the 
European fiscal framework, 
reduce financial 
fragmentation to increase 
private risk-sharing, 
strengthen resilience 
through a common fiscal 
capacity 
Germany Increase private and public 
investment; shift taxes away 
from labour; strengthen 
competition; reduce 
disincentives to work more 
hours; increase sustainability of 
the pension system; promote 
higher wage growth; improve 
educational outcomes and 
skills levels of disadvantaged 
groups.  
use the space within the fiscal 
rules to bolster long-term 
growth; reduce the tax wedge; 
improve education and lifelong 
learning; invest in public 
infrastructure; encourage 
strong wage growth; promote 
innovation; press the banking 
sector to accelerate 
restructuring plans; expand the 
macroprudential toolkit 
make it easier for parents to 
choose the working hours 
they want, strengthen skills, 
reduce tax wedges on labour 
income and shift taxation 
towards less distortive taxes, 
promote better technology 
diffusion and better 
resource allocation; close 
the infrastructure gap. 
Greece Public debt, Public investment, 
regional disparities 
Improve fiscal policies (social 
inclusion, fiscal management), 
investment, financial sector’s 
resilience, productivity 
enhancement (through ALMPs 
and stronger institutions), 
transparency 
Social protection, public 
administration 
enhancement, ALMPs, 
efficiency and fairness of the 
tax system, quality of 
education 
Spain Reduce public debt, improve 
public procurement, pension 
system sustainability, open-
ended contracts, educational 
outcomes, skills mismatches, 
public investment (innovation, 
infrastructure, regional 
disparities), improve 
cooperation at all levels of 
government 
Public debt, ALMPs, foster 
innovation, open-ended 
contracts, skills mismatches, 
barriers to firm growth, regional 
disparities, bank profitability 
and capitalization and liquidity 
risks 
Tax system, education 
outcomes, enhance R&D 
spending, reduce labour 
market duality, regulatory 
differences and barriers to 
firm 
France Public debt, pensions system, 
labour market integration of 
vulnerable groups (migrants), 
private and public investment, 
simplify the tax system, 
regulatory restrictions. 
Public debt, reduction in tax 
burden, labour market reform, 
strengthen competition, the 
resilience of the financial sector 
Reduce labour market 
segmentation, improve 
quality of education, reduce 
regulatory barriers to 
competition, reduce labour 
taxes, strengthen public 
spending efficiency 
Italy Public debt, shift taxes away 
from labour, tax evasion, 
wage bargaining, service 
market liberalization, reform 
Public administration and 
tax structure efficiency, 
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continue pension reforms, 
public investment (in R&D, 
regional disparities), public 
administration efficiency, 
improve competition, 
insolvency regime, corruption, 
labour market (women 
participation, young, ALMPs), 
education outcomes, NPLs, 
banks assets quality and 
efficiency 
the public administration, 
insolvency system, 
consolidation, public 
investment, tax base and taxes 
on labour, NPLs 
improve education and 
training outcomes, ALMPs, 
public investment and 
improve infrastructure  
Cyprus efficiency in the public sector, 
aggressive tax planning, NPLs, 
supervision of non-bank 
financial sector, reform on 
education and training system, 
public investment, territorial 
disparities, transparency 
macroeconomic stability, 
strengthen productivity, NPLs, 
bank capital buffers, public 
debt, reforms in the judiciary 
system, anti-money laundering 
and on the labour market, 
technological investments 
- 
Netherlands debt bias for households, 
distortions in the housing 
market, pension system 
transparency, wage 
growth, tax system 
improvements, strengthen 
lifelong 
learning, public and private 
investment  
Use fiscal space to grow, reduce 
the labour tax wedge and 
household debt bias, 
Harmonize tax benefits and 
social security contributions, 
pension system transparency, 
households’ indebtedness, 
SMEs support 
Lower marginal effective tax 
rates on labour income, Ease 
employment protection for 
permanent contracts, 
ALMPs, limit rent regulation 
in the 
private market, increase 
direct public support for 
R&D 
Poland Public debt, improve the 
efficiency of public spending, 
increase labour market 
participation, raise pension age, 
strengthen the innovation, 
improve the regulatory 
environment  
monitor inflation, narrow VAT 
gap, better target social 
benefits, raise pension age, 
monitor unsecured consumer 
credit warrant, remove barriers 
to investment, improve 
competition 
Lower barriers to 
competition, reform the 
welfare system and reduce 
labour taxes, education 
outcomes, greener energy, 
improve R&D support 
policies 
United 
Kingdom 
Public debt, public and private 
investment 
fiscal consolidation, gradual 
tightening of the monetary 
policy, structural reforms to 
boost productivity, strict 
prudential supervision, 
collaboration with the EU 
prudential authorities 
Improve skills, strengthen 
work incentives and active 
labour market policies, 
enhance housing supply, 
improve public 
infrastructure, promote R&D 
spending 
ALMP: Active Labour Market Policies; NPL: Non-Performing Loans. 
Sources: 
• European Commission (2018), Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic policy of the 
euro area, Brussels, COM (2018) 759 final, 21.11.2018. 
• European Parliament (2019), Recommendations on the economic policy of the euro area under the 2019 European 
Semester - November 2019, Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV), C. Dias, A. Zoppè, F. de Biase Directorate-
General for Internal Policies PE 624.429 – November 2019. 
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• European Parliament (2019), Country-Specific Recommendations for 2018 and 2019. A tabular comparison and an 
overview of implementation, Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV), Jost Angerer, Matteo Ciucci, Momo 
Sakudo, Malcolm Thomson, Directorate-General for Internal Policies PE 634.401 - September 2019. 
• IMF (2018), Spain : 2018 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive 
Director for Spain, International Monetary Fund, November 21, 2018. 
• IMF (2018), United Kingdom : 2018 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; Staff Statement; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for United Kingdom, International Monetary Fund, November 14, 2018. 
• IMF (2019), Euro Area Policies : 2019 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the 
Executive Director for Member Countries, International Monetary Fund, July 11, 2019. 
• IMF (2019), France : 2019 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive 
Director for France, International Monetary Fund, July 24, 2019. 
• IMF (2019), Germany : 2019 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive 
Director for Germany, International Monetary Fund, July 10, 2019. 
• IMF (2019), Italy : 2018 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director 
for Italy, International Monetary Fund, February 6, 2019. 
• IMF (2019), Republic of Poland : 2018 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the 
Alternate Executive Director for the Republic of Poland, International Monetary Fund, February 6, 2019. 
• IMF (2019), The Kingdom of the Netherlands—Netherlands : 2019 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff 
Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for The Kingdom of the Netherlands—Netherlands, International 
Monetary Fund, February 12, 2019. 
• OECD (2018), OECD Economic Surveys: Euro Area 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
• OECD (2019), Economic Policy Reforms 2019: Going for Growth, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
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Table D3: Consistency between CSRs and recommendations to the euro area, 2019 
Euro area 
recommendations 
1. Deepen the Single Market, improve the business environment and the quality 
of institutions. Reduce external debt and pursue reforms to boost 
competitiveness, in particular through productivity in euro-area Member States 
with current-account deficits or high external debt, and strengthen the conditions 
that support wage growth in a manner that respects the role of social partners. 
Implement measures that foster investment in euro-area Member States with 
large current-account surpluses.  
2. Support public and private investment and improve the quality and composition 
of public finances. Rebuild fiscal buffers, especially in euro-area Member States 
with high levels of public debt. Support and implement EU actions to combat 
aggressive tax planning.  
3. Shift taxes away from labour and strengthen education and training systems 
and investment in skills. Improve the effectiveness of active labour market policies 
that support successful labour market transitions.  
4. Banking union and capital market union.  
5. Make swift progress on deepening the EMU, also with a view to strengthening the 
international role of the euro. 
Consistency of euro area countries with recommendations (extracts) 
Germany 1. Use fiscal and structural policies to achieve a sustained upward trend in private 
and public investment, in particular at regional and municipal level... Shift taxes 
away from labour to sources less detrimental to inclusive and sustainable growth 
2. Strengthen the conditions that support higher wage growth, while respecting the 
role of the social partners... 
Greece 1. Post-programme commitments. 
2. Focus investment-related economic policy on sustainable transport and logistics, 
environmental protection, energy efficiency, renewable energy and interconnection 
projects, digital technologies, R&D, education, skills, employability, health, and the 
renewal of urban areas, taking into account regional disparities and the need to ensure 
social inclusion. 
Spain 2. (…) Foster transitions towards open-ended contracts, including by simplifying the 
system of hiring incentives. (…) Reduce early school leaving and improve educational 
outcomes, taking into account regional disparities. Increase cooperation between 
education and businesses with a view to improving the provision of labour market 
relevant skills and qualifications, in particular for information and communication 
technologies. 
3. Focus investment-related economic policy on fostering innovation, resource and 
energy efficiency, upgrading rail freight infrastructure and extending electricity 
interconnections with the rest of the Union, taking into account regional disparities. 
Enhance the effectiveness of policies supporting research and innovation. 
France 2. Foster labour market integration for all job seekers, ensure equal opportunities with 
a particular focus on vulnerable groups including people with a migrant background 
and address skills shortages and mismatches. 
4. Continue to simplify the tax system, in particular by limiting the use of tax 
expenditures, further removing inefficient taxes and reducing taxes on production. 
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Reduce regulatory restrictions, in particular in the services sector, and fully implement 
the measures to foster the growth of firms. 
Italy 1. Shift taxation away from labour, including by reducing tax expenditure and 
reforming the outdated cadastral values. 
2. Ensure that active labour market and social policies are effectively integrated and 
reach out in particular to young people and vulnerable groups. Support women's 
participation in the labour market through a comprehensive strategy, including 
through access to quality childcare and long-term care. Improve educational 
outcomes. 
3. Focus investment-related economic policy on research and innovation, and the 
quality of infrastructure, taking into account regional disparities. (…). Address 
restrictions to competition, particularly in the retail sector and in business services, also 
through a new annual competition law. 
4.  Reduce the length of civil trials. 
5. Foster bank balance sheet restructuring, in particular for small and medium-sized 
banks, by improving efficiency and asset quality, continuing the reduction of non-
performing loans, and diversifying funding. Improve non-bank financing for smaller 
and innovative firms. 
Cyprus 2. Facilitate the reduction of non-performing loans.  
3. Deliver on the reform of the education and training system. 
4. Focus investment-related economic policy on sustainable transport, environment, 
in particular waste and water management, energy efficiency and renewable energy, 
digitalisation, including digital skills, and research and innovation, taking into account 
territorial disparities. 
5. Step up efforts to improve the efficiency of the judicial system. 
Netherlands 1. Reduce the debt bias for households and the distortions in the housing market. 
Ensure that the second pillar of the pension system is more transparent, inter-
generationally fairer and more resilient to shocks. Implement policies to increase 
household disposable income, including by strengthening the conditions that support 
wage growth, while respecting the role of social partners. . 
2. While respecting the medium-term budgetary objective, use fiscal and structural 
policies to support an upward trend in investment.  
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ANNEX E: CONNECTING THE ESRB TO THE MIP  
Table E1: Follow-up of ESRB’s recommendations concerning residential real estate in 
September 2016 
Country ESRB Sep. 2016 Country report Feb 2017 CSRs Aug. 2017 
Austria “While the policy measures 
that have been taken by the 
Austrian authorities are 
appropriate given the nature 
of RRE vulnerabilities in 
Austria, they may not be 
sufficient to fully address the 
robustly growing RRE prices 
and mortgage credit, signs of 
weakening lending standards 
and groups of households 
with elevated debt levels” 
“The European Systemic Risk 
Board, which in 2016 conducted an 
EU-wide forward-looking 
assessment of vulnerabilities 
relating to residential real estate, 
issued a warning to Austria.” (p. 20) 
Nothing in the executive summary 
 
No imbalances 
No CSR on real 
estate. 
Belgium “Vulnerabilities are present in 
Belgium for the collateral, 
household and banking 
stretches” 
“The National Bank plans to 
introduce an add-on to capital 
adequacy requirements for loans 
exceeding 80 % of the property’s 
purchasing price in 2017, in 
addition to the general add-on 
introduced in 2013. The ESRB has 
pointed out that measures to 
directly address vulnerabilities due 
to highly indebted households 
have not been adopted, though, 
and that the tightening of credit 
standards applied in recent years 
appears to have halted” (p. 9) 
Nothing in the executive summary 
No imbalances 
No CSR on real 
estate. 
Denmark “the policies in place are 
assessed as appropriate, but 
may not be sufficient to 
address the vulnerabilities in 
the collateral and household 
stretches” 
“As a result, the European Systemic 
Risk Board — which in 2016 
conducted an EU-wide forward-
looking assessment of 
vulnerabilities relating to 
residential real estate — issued 
warnings to Denmark on 
vulnerabilities in the residential 
real estate sector resulting from a 
combination of a procyclical 
housing tax system, a highly 
regulated rental market, non-
amortising loans, and a high 
proportion of variable interest rate 
mortgages” (p.19) 
No CSR on real 
estate. 
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Nothing in the executive summary 
No imbalances 
Estonia “The policy measures are 
appropriate and expected to 
be sufficient given the current 
level of and trend in 
vulnerabilities” 
No imbalances No CSR on real 
estate. 
Finland “The Finnish authorities have 
applied several banking 
capital measures and an LTV 
limit was set through a 
legislative amendment in July 
2016; however, the 
macroprudential authority 
currently lacks powers to 
implement certain measures 
such as LTI, DTI and DSTI ratio 
limits. For these reasons, the 
policy stance is assessed as 
appropriate and expected to 
be sufficient with respect to 
the collateral and banking 
stretches; however, it may not 
be sufficient for the 
household stretch” 
“Households' debt has increased to 
112 % of their gross disposable 
income. The European Systemic 
Risk Board issued a formal warning 
to Finland in 2016, highlighting the 
high level of indebtedness and the 
associated vulnerabilities.” (p. 11) 
 
Executive summary: “Households' 
debt increased in 2016, with credit 
growth supported by favourable 
credit conditions, including low 
interest rates” (p.1) 
 
Imbalances 
No CSR on real 
estate. 
Luxembourg “the policy stance for the 
collateral stretch is not 
appropriate and not sufficient 
since no measures have been 
taken in this area. Also, for 
household stretch, while the 
measure that has been taken 
is appropriate, it is not 
expected to be sufficient 
given the nature of the 
vulnerabilities” 
“The European Systemic Risk Board 
issued on 22 September 2016 a 
warning to Luxembourg as it 
identified medium-term 
vulnerabilities in the residential 
real estate sector in Luxembourg, 
in relation to the combination of 
high residential real estate prices 
and increasing household 
indebtedness” (p. 25) 
 
Executive summary: “Housing 
demand continues to exceed 
supply, resulting in a sharp 
increase in real estate prices” (p.2) 
 
No imbalances 
No CSR on real 
estate. 
Malta “It is important that the 
Maltese authorities continue 
to monitor developments and 
analyse more granular data on 
the distribution of household 
indebtedness” 
“Current estimates show that the 
excessive price growth prior to 
2008 has corrected and there does 
not appear to be overvaluation of 
house prices.” “The current policy 
No CSR on real 
estate. 
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stance is assessed as appropriate 
(ESRB, 2016).” (p.25) 
 
No imbalances 
The 
Netherlands 
“The measures that have been 
introduced are being 
tightened at a slow pace over 
a long time horizon, which 
may not be fully sufficient 
given the current level of risks. 
Thus the current policy stance 
is assessed as appropriate, but 
is not expected to be sufficient 
in addressing vulnerabilities in 
the household and collateral 
stretches. While the policy 
measures taken for the 
Netherlands are appropriate 
given the nature of RRE 
vulnerabilities, they may not 
be sufficient to fully address 
household and collateral 
stretch vulnerabilities since 
most measures are only being 
gradually phased in and their 
calibration will not be very 
constraining even after full 
implementation” 
“Although the ratio gross 
household debt-to-household 
assets does not stand out 
compared to other peer countries, 
it is high in terms of GDP (almost 
twice as high as the EU-28 average) 
as well as in terms of disposable 
income (232 %). Also, the European 
Systemic Risk board issued a 
warning to the Netherlands, in 
view of increasing house prices 
and debt levels (ESRB, 2016).” (p. 
25)  
 
Executive summary: “Rising house 
prices are boosting household 
assets, but may also provide the 
basis for a build-up of more 
imbalances.” (p. 1) 
 
Imbalances 
“Take measures to 
reduce the 
remaining 
distortions in the 
housing market and 
the debt bias for 
households, in 
particular by 
decreasing 
mortgage interest 
tax deductibility.” 
Slovakia “The policy measures that 
have been taken by the 
Slovakian authorities have 
already had an impact in 
reducing vulnerabilities” 
No imbalances No CSR on real 
estate. 
Sweden “Tools that could directly 
address the high debt relative 
to income are not in place; this 
is related to the fact that the 
mandate of the Swedish 
macroprudential authority is 
unclear with respect to some 
measures. Furthermore, the 
high and overvalued RRE 
prices are not directly 
addressed by current policy 
measures.” 
“the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) — which in 2016 conducted 
an EU-wide forward-looking 
assessment of the residential real 
estate sector in EU countries — 
issued a formal warning to Sweden 
(as well as to seven other Member 
States) on the existence of 
vulnerabilities in the residential 
real estate sector.” (p. 21) 
Executive summary: “The 
continued increase in house prices, 
household debt and bank 
exposure to residential mortgages 
is a growing risk to 
macroeconomic stability” (p. 2) 
“Address risks 
related to 
household debt, in 
particular by 
gradually limiting 
the tax deductibility 
of mortgage interest 
payments or by 
increasing recurrent 
property taxes, 
while constraining 
lending at excessive 
debt-to-income 
levels.” 
 How has the MIP worked in practice to improve the resilience of the euro area? 
 
PE 645.710 55 
Imbalances 
The United 
Kingdom 
“Before the referendum, the 
main risks related to the 
interaction of a household 
stretch (due to household 
indebtedness) and a collateral 
stretch (as indicated by RRE 
prices that were rising from 
already elevated levels and 
decoupling from rent and 
income growth rates).” 
“The European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) – which conducted in 2016 
a forward-looking EU-wide 
assessment of the real estate 
market across the EU– issued a 
warning on 28 November 2016 to 
the UK (as well as to seven other 
Member States) on the 
vulnerabilities of the residential 
real estate sector, given the high 
level of indebtedness of 
households” (p.8) 
Nothing in the executive summary 
No imbalances 
“Take further steps 
to boost housing 
supply” 
RRE: Residential Real Estate. 
Sources: 
ESRB, “Vulnerabilities in the EU residential real estate sector”, November 2016. 
European Commission, country reports, February 2017. 
European council, country-specific recommendations, August 2017. 
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This paper shows how the underlying concept of macroeconomic imbalances contained in the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure (MIP) could be streamlined and clarified. Implementation 
of the country-specific recommendations is disappointing; their internal consistency is sometimes 
missing; despite past reforms, the MIP remains largely a country-by-country approach running the 
risk of aggravating the deflationary bias in the euro area. 
We recommend to streamline the scoreboard around a few meaningful indicators, involve national 
macroprudential and productivity councils, better connect the various recommendations, simplify 
the language and further involve the Commission into national policy discussions. 
This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON 
Committee).  
 
